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Abstract: This study examines how ownership concentration affects dividend payout, 
and ultimately firm performance. Regression analyses are performed on a dataset 
spanning 11 years (2005-2015) among Malaysian publicly listed firms. The results show 
that shareholders with concentrated ownership play an important role in determining 
dividend payout and driving firm performance. Specifically, ownership concentration 
is associated with low dividend payout, but it improves firm performance. Overall, 
this study suggests that ownership concentration may also be an effective monitoring 
mechanism. 
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of ownership concentration on 
dividend payout of Malaysian firms from an agency perspective. In the spirit of studying 
the severity of expropriation of minority shareholders in Malaysian public listed 
companies, this paper further analyses how ownership concentration influences firm 
performance.
In the agency theory context, studies (for an example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000) have revealed that dividend payout is used to prevent 
shareholders with power from diverting retained earnings for their own benefits. 
Although agency conflict between the managers and shareholders is less severe in 
closely-held firms, such firms deal with greater conflict on the relationship between 
majority and minority shareholders. Despite the usefulness of dividend payout in 
reducing the said agency problem, researches are mostly focused on countries with 
strong investor protection, but not those with weak investor protection (La Porta et al., 
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2000). Besides, the trend of dividend payout varies not only across time but also across 
countries, especially between developed and developing countries.
Likewise, Malaysia has a different capital market integration, legal system, 
economic development and country credit risk (Fauver, Houston, & Naranjo, 2003). 
Besides, the Asian financial crisis caused the Malaysian authorities to reform and 
restructure corporations rapidly, among which included strengthening corporate 
governance. Companies in Malaysia have also been reported to have highly-
concentrated ownership as compared with those in other Asian countries (Cheung, 
Stouraitis, & Wong, 2005; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Shang, Gao, & Zhang, 
2013). Problems associated with the high concentration of ownership and control 
in Malaysia include room for controlling shareholders to make less dividend payout 
decision. This is because they prefer to use the firm’s money for their private benefits, 
resulting in severe large shareholders and minority shareholders’ conflicts.
A key contribution of this study is that it sheds additional light on the inconclusive 
issues regarding the effects of ownership concentration on dividend payout, which is 
still unexplored in an emerging market like Malaysia. From here, investors can observe 
the opportunistic behaviour of controlling shareholders on how to screen and select 
the best suit stocks in building their portfolio. Numerous researches have been carried 
out to identify the unique characteristics of a firm and how it enhances dividend policy. 
However, the empirical significance of these studies remains largely unknown especially 
in terms of the relation between ownership concentration, dividend payout and firm 
performance. This paper fills the gap. Other contributions of this paper are as follows. 
First, this is the earliest study that empirically examines the impact of ownership 
concentration as a main independent variable on dividend payout and how dividend 
payout affects the firm performance in one go for Malaysian firms. Second, three 
measures of ownership concentration are employed in this study.
The next section provides a brief literature on ownership concentration, dividend 
payout and firm performance and the hyphotheses development. The following section 
is an explanation of the research method employed in this study, and analysis of the 
result in detail. Implications and conclusion are presented in the last section.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Ownership Concentration and Dividend Payout
In East Asian corporations, it is common that controlling shareholders have power 
primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. Controlling 
shareholders tend to exploit and seek personal benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders, which lead to the agency problem (Claessens et al., 2000). Prior studies 
reveal that as ownership concentration increases, Malaysian firms tend to pay low 
dividends because concentrated shareholders can exploit the company resources and 
are unpunished for such misconduct. Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) further claimed 
that ownership concentration may permit large shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders. In this way, dominant shareholders can act in their own best interest 
and exert their power to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders 
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by redistributing wealth among them. Hence, a negative relationship is found between 
the largest shareholder and dividend payout for companies from Germany and Italy as 
observed by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006), respectively. 
Some similar results were also provided by Gonzalez, Molina, Pablo, and Rosso (2017) 
for Latin America.
However, Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) proposed the idea that ownership 
concentration is a credible mechanism to reduce agency problems. De Cesari (2012) 
also agreed that ownership concentration is positively associated with dividend 
payout, which prevents the conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. 
Contrary to this, Andres, Betzer, Bongard, Haesner, and Theissen (2013) indicated that 
ownership concentration affects dividend payout, depending on the type of controlling 
shareholders among German firms. Based on the above discussions, the hypothesis is 
thus developed as follows:
  H1: Ownership concentration is significantly related to dividend payout.
2.2 Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance
Prior studies suggest that pursuing private benefits by large and dominant shareholders 
may lead to poor firm performance because private shareholder interests and firm 
interests may differ. Similarly, ownership concentration exerts a negative effect on the 
return on assets of firms. Kuznetsov, Kapelyushnikov, and Dyomina (2008) explained 
that controlling shareholders prefer to invest in low-risk or low-productive projects 
when they feel that their position is being threatened. Similarly, in Korea, Joh (2003) 
reveals that ownership concentration negatively affects firm profitability. Consistently, 
Basir Malan, Salamudin, and Ahmad (2015) argued that highly concentrated ownership 
is negatively associated with the performance of Malaysian firms due to expropriation 
of minority interest. However, from another school of thought, the researchers believe 
that there is a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. According to Ramli (2010) and Thanatawee (2012), when ownership is 
concentrated, firm performance tends to improve, but beyond a certain point, firm 
performance decreases because shareholders gain so much control that they can 
maximise their own welfare by using their voting powers. Similarly, Claessens et al. 
(2000) confirmed that ownership concentration initially exerts an increasing effect and 
then a decreasing effect on firm performance. However, Cronqvist and Mattias (2003) 
documented that ownership concentration and firm performance are not related in 
Swedish public listed firms. Therefore, the hypothesis is designed as follows: 
H2: Ownership concentration is significantly related to firm performance.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Source of Data
To form the sample, we first select all 811 companies that are listed on the Main Board 
of Bursa Malaysia as of 31 December 2015. After excluding finance, insurance and unit 
trust companies due to differences in regulatory requirement and data incompleteness, 
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the total observation remains at 5,584 from 580 companies for the period from 2005 
to 2015. In accordance with the research purpose and to ensure data validity, the initial 
sample is screened according to the criteria as shown in Table 1.
3.2 Model and Variables
Two dependent variables are considered in the model for examining dividend payout 
and firm performance. Dividend payout (Div) is measured as the ratio of cash dividends 
to net profit (Feng, 2011; Kajola, Adewumi, & Oworu, 2015). Firm Performance (Perf ) is 
measured as the ratio of net profit after tax to shareholder’s equity (ROE) (Bany-Ariffin, 
Mat Nor, & McGowan Jr, 2010).
The independent variable, ownership concentration (OC), is the portion of ordinary 
shares held by the block shareholders, including the portions held by the top largest, 
the top three largest and the top five largest shareholders, respectively, following Lean, 
Ting, and Kweh (2015). 
The following control variables are also included in the model: (i) Firm leverage 
(Flev) is total liabilities divided by total assets; (ii) Firm liquidity (Fliq) is current assets 
divided by current liabilities (Paydar & Bardai, 2012); (iii) Firm growth (Fgrowth) is 
change in total assets (Flint, Tan, & Tian, 2010); (iv) Firm size (Fsize) is logged total 
assets (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006); (v) Firm age (Fage) is logged 
number of years of listing (Zunaidah & Fauzias, 2008); (vi) Board size (Bsize) is logged 
number of board of directors (Farinha, 2003); (vii) Independent Director (INDDIR) is 
number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors (Johl, Kaur, 
& Cooper, 2013); (viii) Board meetings (MEETINGS) is the number of board of director’s 
meetings (Johl et al., 2013).
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis 
(2000), when ownership is concentrated, the agency problem becomes more severe 
because the controlling shareholders tend to set a disclosure policy that allows them 
to conceal their diversion activities (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 
2003). Thus, agency theory provides a framework on how to create an effective 
protection system to reduce the agency cost. As such, regression analysis is performed 
Table 1. Process of data collection
 Number of 
 observations
Initial number of observations 8,921
1) After selecting companies with continuous operations throughout the 
 sample period of 2005 to 2015. 7,562
2) After removing all companies from banking, finance, and real estate investment 
 trust sectors, which were identified based on Bursa Malaysia classification   
 from (www.malaysiastock.biz) to enhance the comparability of the sample. 6,380
3) After removing companies with missing data, incomplete information, or 
 discontinuous operation in the sample period. 5,584
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to investigate the impact of ownership concentration on dividend payout and firm 
performance. The following regressions are thus developed:
 (1)
  
 (2)
where α0 represents the constant terms in Equations 1 and 2, respectively; i = 1 to 9, 
are coefficients of the respective independent or control variables for Equations 1 and 
2, respectively; and εit represents error terms.
4. Results and Analysis
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The 
univariate result shows that the sample companies use 38% of their net profit to pay 
cash dividends. The mean of OC 1 reveals that almost 30% of the company shares 
are held by the one largest shareholder. For ROE, the mean reveals that the sample 
Div OC Flev Fliq Fgrowth Fsizeit it it it it it= + + + + + +α α α α α α α0 1 2 3 4 5 6Fage
Bsize INDDIR MEETINGS
it
it it it it           + + + +α α α ε7 8 9
Perf OC Flev Fliq Fgrowth Fsizeit it it it it it= + + + + + +α α α α α α α0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
Fage
Bsize INDDIR MEETINGS
it
it it it it           + + + +α α α ε
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
  N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Div 5604 0.385 4.862 -34.814 293.238
OC 1 5584 0.295 0.164 0.000 0.992
OC 3 5584 0.465 0.176 0.000 0.992
OC 5 5584 0.517 0.183 0.174 0.999
ROE 5607 0.054 0.501 -20.765 12.526
Flev 5584 0.423 0.373 0.003 13.148
Fliq 5584 6.967 102.312 0.000 4101.545
Fsize 5584 12.877 1.399 8.908 18.579
Fgrowth 5584 0.568 1.006 0.000 28.627
Fage 5584 2.375 0.804 0.000 3.989
Bsize 5584 1.954 0.247 0.693 2.890
INDDIR 5584 0.448 0.118 0.143 1.000
MEETINGS 5584 5.071 1.257 1.000 21.000
Note: Div is the ratio of cash dividends to net profit; ROE is the ratio of net profit after tax to shareholder’s 
equity, the ratio of net profit after tax to total assets and net profit after tax to total outstanding shares, 
respectively; OC is the percentage of common shares held by the top one largest shareholder (OC 1), 
the top three largest shareholders (OC 3) and the top five largest shareholders (OC 5), respectively; 
Flev is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; Fliq is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities; 
Fgrowth is the ratio of market value of firm to total asset; Fage is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years a company has since been listed; Fsize is the natural logarithm of total assets; Bsize 
is the natural logarithm of the number of directors in the board; INDDIR is the ratio of number of 
independent directors to the total number of directors; MEETINGS is the number of board of directors 
meetings held during a financial year.
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companies generate 5% profitability of the shareholders’ investment in the company. 
Additionally, the mean of Bsize implies that seven directors are in the board on the 
average. INDDIR shows that almost 50% of the sample companies’ board of directors 
are independent directors. The Flev mean explains that 42% of the company assets are 
financed by debt. The Fgrowth mean of 0.568 indicates that companies show positive 
economic growth.
4.2 Regression Analysis 
Table 3 shows the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)1 regression results of using 
Div as the dependent variable. The F-statistic indicates the overall significance of the 
equations at the 5% significance level. The empirical evidence of Equation 1 depicts a 
significantly negative relationship between the top largest shareholder (OC 1) and Div. 
This finding is consistent with those of Benjamin and Pajuste (2011) and Guizani and 
Kouki (2011), indicating that ownership concentration is associated with a low level of 
dividend payout. This study performs robustness checks by replacing OC 1 with OC 3 
and OC 5, respectively. The estimation results in Table 3 remain qualitatively the same, 
supporting that low levels of dividend payout are likely to be observed in firms with a 
high percentage of ownership concentration.
Table 3. Regression analysis – Equation 1
Variables Dependent variable: Div
Intercept 1.790* 1.790* 1.692*
OC 1 -1.055**  
OC 3  -0.642* 
OC 5   -0.195*
Flev -3.089*** -3.031*** -2.964
Fliq 0.286 0.288 0.284
Fgrowth 1.032 0.964 0.907
Fsize 1.186 1.116 1.058
Fage 0.321 0.357 0.401
Bsize -2.541** -2.526** -2.504
INDDIR -1.688* -1.693* -1.67
MEETINGS 0.854 0.865 0.849
R2 0.006 0.005 0.005
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.003 0.003
F-statistics 2.141** 2.062** 2.020**
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1 Diagnostic tests (not reported) indicate that the fixed (F test) or random effects (Hausman test) panel 
methods are redundant, suggesting that the extent of within-panel correlation of observations is negligibly 
small. Therefore, the OLS regression results provide consistent estimations in this study. Besides, we find 
no heteroscedasticity problem.
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As for the control variables, Flev, Bsize, and INDDIR have a significant negative 
relationship with dividend payout. These results are consistent with those of Benjamin 
and Pajuste (2011) and Ghasempour and Vakilifar (2015), who explained that high 
leverage means the firm is highly risky in cash flow and pays low dividends to evade the 
cost of raising external capital.
Table 4 shows the OLS regression results of using ROE as the dependent variable. 
The F-statistics indicates the overall significance of the equations at the 1% significance 
level. The empirical evidence of Equation 2 depicts a significantly positive relationship 
between top largest shareholder’s ownership (OC 1) and firm performance (ROE). This 
finding is consistent with those of Ma, Naughton, and Tian (2010) and Lepore, Paolone, 
Pisano, and Alvino (2017) who supported that controlling shareholders can implement 
effective monitoring activities on the management and other controlling shareholders 
who may have different objectives toward the firm. Hence, companies with ownership 
concentration appear to be an effective internal corporate governance mechanism 
that helps enhance performance. The robustness test with OC 3 and OC 5 also show 
consistent findings, whereby ownership concentration has a significantly positive 
relation with firm performance. 
The other variables for Equation 2, Fgrowth, Fsize, and Bsize show a significantly 
positive relationship with firm performance (ROE), consistent with the findings of 
Uwuigbe, Jafaru, and Ajayi (2012) and Ghasempour and Vakilifar (2015). Meanwhile, 
Flev, Fage, and Bsize have a significant negative relation with ROE, similar to the findings 
of Rehman and Hussain (2013) and Velnampy, Nimalthasan, and Kalaiarasi (2014). Fliq, 
MEETINGS and INDDIR show an insignificant relationship with firm performance. 
Table 4. Regression analysis – Equation 2
Variables Dependent variable: ROE
Intercept 2.990** 2.905** 1.847*
OC 1 2.695***  
OC 3  1.664* 
OC 5   1.431*
Div 38.813*** 38.761*** 38.745***
Flev -4.270*** -4.130*** -4.080***
Fliq -1.438 -1.441 -1.431
Fgrowth 36.903*** 37.147*** 37.261***
Fsize 2.654*** 2.846*** 2.914***
Fage -4.818*** -4.899*** -4.908**
Bsize -2.428** -2.462*** -2.482**
INDDIR -0.928 -0.917 -0.908
MEETINGS -1.742 -1.768 -1.760
R2 0.476 0.475 0.475
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.473 0.473
F-statistics 307.682*** 306.826*** 306.689***
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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4.3 Discussion
Overall, the results of the regression analyses above indicate that in Malaysia, com-
panies with a high degree of ownership concentration are less likely to pay dividend 
because the majority shareholders prefer to use the cash flow to invest in different 
projects that are profitable for them. The existence of a reverse relationship between 
ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder and the amount of 
dividends paid is a manifestation of the agency problem between major and minority 
shareholders. Second, ownership concentration also enhances the profitability of 
the company as it supports the agency perspective that ownership concentration 
appears to be an effective internal corporate governance strategy that helps enhance 
performance.
As an additional test to verify the validity of our results, we further examine wheth-
er firm performance is significantly related to dividend payout. It is well documented 
in prior studies that firm performance is positively associated with the dividend pay-
out of firms. On one hand, Waithaka, Ngugi, and Kirago (2012) discovered that firm 
performance is negatively influencing dividend payout in Kenyan firms. On the other 
hand, Amidu and Abor (2006) identified a positive and significant relationship between 
firm performance and dividend payout. They further justified that dividend payout is 
an essential element in reflecting the performance of a company to shareholders and 
potential investors. Meanwhile, Arnott and Asness (2003) pointed out that the subop-
timal investment and less-than-ideal projects by managers with excess free cash flows 
at their disposal cause low dividend, which leads to low growth. Hence, they concluded 
that there is a positive relationship between current dividend payout and future earn-
ings growth according to free cash flow theory. This situation is prominent in firms with 
limited growth opportunities or a tendency toward over-investment. Paying substantial 
dividends, which in turn would require managers to raise funds from the issuance of 
shares and reduce conflicts of interest, may subject the management to significant scru-
tiny and thus curtail suboptimal investment (Jabbouri, 2016).
Therefore, the relationship between firm performance and dividend payout is also 
examined. Table 5 presents the regression analysis results of using Div as the dependent 
variable. The F-statistics indicate the overall significance of the equations at the 1% 
significance level. The results depict a significantly positive relationship between ROE 
and Div. This finding is consistent with Guizani and Kouki (2011). The positive effect 
of ROE on dividend payout remains quantitively the same when the study replaces 
ROE with ROA and EPS, respectively. ROA is the ratio of net profit after tax to total 
assets, while EPS is net profit after tax to total outstanding shares. The results of Table 
5 confirm the existence of a positive association between the firm performance and 
dividend payout. For the control variables, the finding shows that only Fliq, Fage, and 
MEETINGS have a significantly positive relationship with Div. Meanwhile, Flev, Fgrowth, 
and Fsize have a significant negative relationship with dividend payout. This result is 
consistent with those of Benjamin and Pajuste (2011) and Ghasempour and Vakilifar 
(2015). The significant coefficients of firm performance confirm that the results of this 
study are in line with prior studies and thus provide support for the empirical results of 
Equations 1 and 2.
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5. Conclusion
This study investigates the effect of ownership concentration on dividend payout and 
firm performance, as well as the association between firm performance and dividend 
payout as a validity check. This paper analyses a sample of 580 publicly listed Malaysian 
firms over the period 2005–2015 and try to answer two questions. First and most 
importantly, does concentrated ownership affect dividend payout? The empirical 
analysis shows a negative relationship between ownership concentration and dividend 
payout. The results demonstrate that a high degree of ownership concentration is less 
likely to pay dividend because the majority shareholders prefer to use the cash flow 
to invest in different projects that are profitable for them, rather than pay dividend to 
the minority shareholders. This finding is consistent with those of Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003), Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006), Renneboog and Trojanowski (2007), Berezinets, 
Ilina, and Alekseeva (2014), and Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2016).
Second, does ownership concentration affect firm performance? This paper finds 
a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance as the 
shareholders can implement effective monitoring activities on the management and 
other controlling shareholders who may have different objectives toward the firm. 
These findings are aligned with those of Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, and Wong (2005), 
Heugens, Van Essen, and van Oosterhout (2009), Harada and Nguyen (2011), Ma et 
al. (2010), and Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2015). This study helps to create guidelines 
for the relevant policy makers to plan and design policies that will suit the Malaysian 
business environment as it shows that there is a need to strengthen the policy to 
protect minority shareholders in Malaysia. Notably, this study does not separate the 
Table 5. Regression analysis – Additional test
Variables Dependent variable: Div
Intercept 2.721** 2.374** 9.267***
ROE 38.735***  
ROA  87.061*** 
EPS   45.068***
Flev -4.638*** -6.817*** -1.131
Fliq 2.299** 2.698*** 1.206
Fgrowth -17.639*** -24.082*** -13.153***
Fsize -1.936* -2.363** -9.027***
Fage 3.171** 7.580*** -0.306
Bsize -0.667 -0.635 -2.260**
INDDIR -0.823 -1.125 -3.047**
MEETINGS 1.650* 1.989** 1.203
R2 0.31 0.692 0.378
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.692 0.376
F-statistics 169.618*** 848.700*** 228.908***
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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type of shareholders as moderating variables and the samples are obtained only from 
the main market of Bursa Malaysia.
Therefore, future research may consider different types of shareholders and use 
samples from different sources. Besides, future research should also consider studying 
the trend of dividend payout during different economic situations because companies 
might pay different levels of dividends in bad economic situations. Finally, while 
this study provides supplementary confirmation that ownership concentration is an 
important factor of dividend payout, we caution readers that the findings may not be 
generalised beyond emerging markets.
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